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Abstract
A proposal to combat free-riding in international climate agreements is the
notion of a “climate club” or coalition of countries to encourage high levels of
participation. Empirical models of climate clubs in the early stages relied on
the analysis of single-period coalition formation. The results suggested that
there were limits on the potential strength of clubs and that it would be
difficult to have deep abatement strategies in the club framework. The
current work extends the single-period approach to many periods and
develops an approach analyzing “supportable policies” to analyze multiperiod clubs. The major surprise of the study is the interaction between the
club structure and rapid technological change. Neither alone will produce
incentive-compatible policies that can attain the ambitious objectives of
international climate policy. The trade sanctions without rapid technological
decarbonization will be too costly to produce highly costly abatement;
similarly, rapid technological decarbonization by itself will not induce deep
abatement because of country free-riding. But the two together can achieve
the international objectives.
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I.

Background

Early research on climate clubs
Global agreements on climate change date back to the Kyoto Protocol
in 1997, yet little substantial coordinated abatement has taken place. Freeriding is a major hurdle in the solution of global externalities, and it is at the
heart of the failure to deal with climate change. Without an appropriate
structure, no single country has an incentive to cut its emissions sharply.
Moreover, if there is an agreement, nations have a strong incentive not to
participate. If they do participate, there is a further incentive to miss
ambitious objectives. The outcome is a non-cooperative free-riding equilibrium in
which few countries undertake strong climate-change policies – a situation
that closely resembles the current international policy environment. Nations
speak loudly but carry no stick at all.
One proposal to combat free-riding is the notion of a “climate club” or
coalition of countries to encourage high levels of participation and
abatement. The idea, analyzed in Nordhaus (2015), is that nations can
overcome the syndrome of free-riding in international climate agreements if
they adopt the club model rather than voluntary arrangements. The central
feature of the club model is that nations would be penalized if they did not
meet their obligations.
The club model analyzed here centers on an “international target
carbon price” that is the focal provision of the agreement. (The power of the
price as a single instrument has been shown in Weitzman 2015.) For example,
countries might agree that each country will implement policies that produce
a minimum domestic carbon price of $50 per metric ton of CO2. The target
price might apply to 2020 and rise over time at, say, 3% per year in real
terms.
Additionally, both theory and history suggest that some form of
sanction on non-participants is required to induce countries to participate in
agreements with local costs but diffuse benefits (see particularly Barrett 1994,
2003). While the exact degree of free-riding and cooperation will differ
according to the assumptions about coalition formation and stability, most
theoretical and empirical modeling suggests that reaching a grand bargain of
most regions with strong abatement will be extraordinarily difficult (Carraro
and Siniscalco 1993, Chandler and Tulkens 1995, Bosetti et al. 2012, Lessmann
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et al. 2015, Keohane and Victor 2016). Studies of club-like structures can be
found in Gollier and Tirole (2015), Cramton, Ockenfels, and Stoft (2017),
Böhringer, Carbone, and Rutherford (2016), Keohane, Petsonk, and Hanafi
(2017).
The proposal in the climate club was a uniform tariff on all imports of
non-club countries into the club. Take as an example a penalty tariff of 5%. If
non-participant country A exports $100 billion into the club region, it would
be penalized by $5 billion of tariffs. In estimates of the coalition stability of a
one-shot climate club using the C-DICE model, Nordhaus (2015) estimated
that climate clubs would be extremely effective (relative to no club) for low
carbon prices. However, the modeling suggested that it would be difficult to
support carbon prices above $50 per ton of CO2 with the economic structure
of the current period (2011 in those estimates).
However, that analysis was limited to a single period. The reason was
that the computational complexity of the C-DICE model was too great for a
full dynamic model.2 The present study tackles the more complex question of
sustainable climate clubs in a multi-period framework.
Major results
Here are the major results. The major tool used here is the concept of a
supportable policy, whether emissions price, emissions limit, or other constraints on
producer and consumer behavior. We can interpret supportable policies as ones
with maximum stringency given the incentives to be in the club (here the
incentives are tariffs, but they could be other ones). The most important
example is a supportable carbon price. Policies that have target carbon prices
lower than the supportable price have lower abatement; policies with higher
The original model had 15 regions reflecting actual economic and environmental
data. Finding a stable coalition is combinatorial in nature, and its solution is
thought to be in the class of NP-hard problems. There appears to be no efficient
algorithm for calculating stable coalitions, and current algorithms claim reasonable
results in time O(n2n). In principle, we would need to take each of the 2n coalitions
and determine whether they are stable against all the other 2n - 1 coalitions, which
requires about 22n ≈ 109 comparisons for 15 regions. While this is computationally
feasible with supercomputers, it is unnecessarily burdensome, particularly for
model construction and comparison of regimes. The earlier calculations relied on an
evolutionary algorithm to find stable coalitions. Experiments indicate that stable
coalitions are usually found within 100 iterations. A full dynamic analysis with
multiple periods would require > 10100 comparisons and was beyond the capability
of the analysis.
2
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target carbon prices induce countries to drop out of the club and therefore
also have lower abatement (as countries move to their national targets, which
are substantially lower and essentially zero). The study defines supportable
targets, shows how to find them in a simple example, and then develops a
model which allows calculation of supportable policies over time.
A second contribution is to develop a simple analytical model of the
supportable participation of a party in a regime (such as a climate club) that imposes
costs but also conveys rewards for participation (or avoids punishments for nonparticipation). While estimating the equilibrium of a coalition in a dynamic
framework is computationally extremely burdensome (as noted in footnote
2), determining supportable policies is relatively simple, both analytically
and computationally. The simple analytical model below shows that the time
path of supportable policies for the climate club depends primarily on six
determinants: openness (the trade-output ratio), the tariff rate, the rate of
decarbonization, the fraction of the world in the club, the welfare loss per
unit tariff, and the rate of technological change in the backstop technology.
Additionally, in the simple model, the growth of output does not affect the
outcome because it cancels out for costs and benefits.
The third contribution is developing a simple global computable model (Trade
DICE or TDICE) for estimating the supportable carbon prices, emissions, as well as
the geophysical variables such as concentrations and temperature. The model uses
much of the structure of the standard DICE model (described below), but
adds equations that represent the “club” variables such as trade, the gains
from trade, and the costs of trade sanctions. By combining the different
components, it is possible to determine the supportable carbon prices and
emissions where the costs of participating (through abatement) just equal the
costs of non-participation (the trade sanctions).
Fourth, the results of the TDICE model show several features. To begin
with, in the baseline-parameter scenario for technology and openness, even
with strong trade sanctions of 10% uniform tariffs for non-participation,
emissions are slowed sharply in the club relative to no policy but do not attain the
high levels of abatement that are the objectives of international climate policy. With
baseline parameters and strong sanctions, industrial emissions in 2050 are 27
GtCO2, rather than the target of zero. Global temperature in 2100 reaches 3.1
°C rather than the 1.5 or 2 °C targets. This result confirms the statement in
Barrett (2018) that the climate club as originally conceived is insufficient to
attain international objectives.
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A fifth finding shows the importance of the combination of the club
incentives and rapid decarbonizing technological change. As mentioned above,
two important parameters in the analysis are the rate of decarbonization and
the rate of technological change in the backstop technology. These provide
powerful boosts to the club incentive because they lower the cost of
participation. As a polar and ambitious objective, the model examines the
club incentives along with a rapid rate of decarbonization (2% per year faster
than historical rates) as well as a rapid decline in the cost of the backstop
technology (at 4% per year instead of 0% in the base assumption). With these
assumptions along with the strong tariff incentive of 10% penalty tariff,
global emissions in the TDICE model hit zero by 2050 and global
temperature has a maximum of 1.9 °C. While the combination of a strong
club and rapid technological change are at the outer edge of realism, they do
point to a potential political-economic-technology mechanism for attaining
ambitious climate objectives.
A sixth finding comes from developing a regionalized version of the
model (TRICE, or Trade and RICE). The model is only a sketch of a full
regional model but allows us to investigate the impacts of regional differences in
features such as carbon intensities and costs of abatement on supportable policies.
The TRICE approach indicates that supportable carbon prices differ
markedly across regions. Taking 2020 as an example, the range is from a low
of $72/tCO2 for Russia, almost as low for China of $86/tCO2, to $285/tCO2
for Sub-Saharan Africa. Russia has a low supportable price because of its
high carbon-intensity, with the converse for Sub-Saharan Africa. The impact
of regional heterogeneity, as seen by comparing TDICE and TRICE, is to
lower the global supportable carbon price and supportable emissions
reductions. The reason is that some of the countries with the largest
emissions, particularly China and the US, have relatively low supportable
carbon prices.
A seventh finding concerns the “carbon price Laffer curve.” This
shows the relationship between the target carbon price and total emissions
reductions. It is hump-shaped: at a carbon price of $0, there are no emissions
reductions, while at extremely high carbon prices, there is zero participation.
Using the TRICE model, we calculate the carbon price Laffer curve for 2050 has peak
emissions reduction at $100/tCO2 for the 5% tariff and $160/ton for the 10% tariff.
Figure 5 shows the point graphically.
Finally, the major surprise of the study is the interaction between the club
structure and rapid decarbonizing technological change. Neither a club nor rapid
5

technological change by themselves will produce incentive-compatible
policies that can attain the ambitious objectives of international climate
policy. The trade sanctions without rapid technological decarbonization will
be too costly to produce highly costly abatement; similarly, rapid
technological decarbonization by itself will not induce deep abatement
because of country free-riding. But the two together – providing incentives to
participate but at the same time lowering the costs of participation – are a
team that, in principle and according to simple modeling, can achieve the
international objectives.

II. Analytical extension of climate clubs for many periods
Clubs and international agreements
We begin with a simplified analysis of a dynamic model of a climate
club. The present study develops a new approach to the issue by analyzing
“supportable” policies in climate agreements or climate clubs. Here is the
basic idea. Many activities have the characteristics of public goods, where the
benefits are diffuse, or more precisely have some elements of non-exclusivity
and non-rivalry. The classic example is a lighthouse (or a GPS in the modern
era), where none are excluded, and where the beacons enjoyed by one do not
crowd out or exclude others.
Public goods create a challenge because they are prone to free-riding,
where some users may enjoy the benefits (light) without paying.
Governments solve the public-goods problem using their coercive powers of
taxation to finance public works like lighthouses. For the case of private
activities, such as recreational or sporting facilities, people can join together
in clubs, which are a mechanism that allow voluntary agreements to provide
public goods. What is a club? A club is a voluntary group deriving mutual
benefits from sharing the costs of producing an activity that has public-good
characteristics. The gains from a successful club are sufficiently large that
members will pay dues and adhere to club rules in order to gain the benefits
of membership.
The major conditions for a successful club include the following: (1)
that there is a public-good-type resource that can be shared (whether the
benefits from a treaty or the enjoyment of a golf course); (2) that the
cooperative arrangement, including the cost, is beneficial for each of the
members; (3) that non-members can be excluded or penalized at relatively
6

low cost to members; and (4) that the membership is stable in the sense that
no one wants to leave.
From an analytical point of view, international treaties can be viewed
as clubs. Under the central principles of modern international law, nations
are sovereign and have the fundamental right of political self-determination.
The current system requires that countries consent to joining international
agreements (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third
State without its consent.” Treaty of Vienna, 1969, article 34). All
international agreements are therefore essentially voluntary
Given the structure of treaties, we can look to the characteristics of
clubs to understand what can provide durable international agreements. The
most important ingredients are that a public-goods treaty, first, imposes costs
on participants and, second, has sufficient deterrents for non-participants
that the agreement is stable or self-enforcing.
As examples, the current international-trade system provides access to
other countries’ markets with low trade barriers while providing access to
the home market. For military alliances, the benefits are peace and survival
while the costs are military spending. In all cases, countries must contribute
dues – these being low trade barriers for trade or burden sharing in defense
treaties. The requirement for a successful international system to deal with
climate change can look to the theory and practice of clubs for its inspiration.
Modeling supportable policies in a climate club
The earlier analysis in Nordhaus (2015) found that it would be difficult
to induce high participation with a carbon price well above $50 per ton of
CO2 in a one-shot climate game. The full analysis of a multi-period climate
club appears computationally impossible with combinatorial tools, so the
present study uses a different approach, which is the analysis of supportable
policies. These are ones that are on the frontier of what can be supported by
the club sanctions for non-participation. More specifically, the study analyzes
“supportable carbon prices,” which are carbon prices that can be supported
by reasonable penalty tariffs (up to 10% uniform tariff).
Here is the basic analysis. A rational economic analysis by each
country will involve a comparison of the costs of the penalty tariffs (if out of
the club) against costs of the abatement (if in the club). We can write the two
terms as follows for a typical country. Begin with the losses from the trade
penalty for countries who are non-participants:
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(1)

Trade lossi =  TziYi i

where  = participation ratio of countries in the club, T = tariff rate,
z = ratio of trade to GDP, Yi is GDP, and  = welfare loss per % tariff rate.

The parameters with a subscript i refer to country parameters, while
those without a subscript are either outside the control of countries (e.g.,
other countries’ participation decisions) or rules of the climate club (e.g., the
target carbon price and the penalty tariff rate). Equation (1) shows the
welfare losses from the penalty tariffs. The first four parameters on the right
are observable data and pose no difficulty. However, the welfare impact of
trade is extremely complicated and controversial. The research here relies on
Ossa’s calculations as discussed in Nordhaus (2015), see particularly the
appendix. The welfare loss is close to linear up to a tariff rate of 10%, so it is
taken as linear for the present analysis.
The second term is the abatement cost for countries who are
participants. In the simplified model in Nordhaus (2015), abatement cost is
the following:
(2)

Abatement cost =  i i  Yi

where  i = abatement cost parameter in current period,  = parameter
of the cost function, and i = emissions control rate.

In the earlier analysis, β = 2, and that will be followed in the analysis of
this section. The marginal cost of abatement is equalized to the carbon price,
which yields:

 = 2 i iYi (C / E ) = 2 i i /  i
(3)
i =  i / (2 i )
where  = marginal cost of abatement and the carbon price
or carbon tax in a market context, and  = emissions /output ratio.
Putting (3) into (2) yields:

(4)

Abatement cost = i ( i / 2i )2 Yi =  i 2 2Yi / 4i

This can be simplified by substituting in the cost or carbon price of the
backstop technology, ( p ) . This represents the carbon price at which
emissions are zero and the emissions control rate is 1. This is obtained from
equation (3) by setting μ = 1, which yields p = 2 i /  i . Substituting into (4)
yields:
8

(4')

Abatement cost = i ( i / 2i )2 Yi =  i 2Yi / p 2

Many of the parameters are observable ones. GDP and CO2 emissions
are reported more or less accurately by countries today. The target carbon tax
rate is a design parameter of the climate club. The cost of the backstop
technology is highly uncertain but been the subject of detailed research. Note
that the uncertainties about the parameters are issues that arise for countries
in deciding whether to participate but are not important for the impact of the
program on emissions and climate change.
The dividing line between participation and non-participation is
“supportable international target carbon price,” or the target carbon price at
which the cost of abatement exactly equals the welfare cost of the penalty
tariff. Equation (5) shows the dividing line where the cost of abatement just
equals the cost of the tariff. Equation (6) then solves for the supportable
carbon price as a function of the parameters.

(5)

 TziYi i =  i 2Yi / p 2

or
(6)  * = p ( Tzi i /  i ) −1/2
We can also write this in terms of the supportable emissions control
rate, μ*. Equation (7) equates the two costs using equations (1) and (2).
Equation (8) then solves for the supportable control rate.

(7)

zi i Ti =  i i*2

or
(8)

i* = (2 zi i T / pi i ) −1/2
A final result is for supportable emissions. Using (8), we have

Ei =  iYi (1 − i )
For simplicity, set Yi = 1. Then we have supportable emissions using (8):
(9) Ei* =  i (1 − (2 zi i T / pi i ) −1/2 )
Equations (6), (8), and (9) indicate that the supportable carbon price,
emissions, and the emissions-control rate change over time as a function of
the parameters of the economy. Equation (8) is easier to interpret and will be
used in what follows.
9

Begin by taking the time derivative of the logarithm of (8) and denote
the variable xˆ = d [ln( x)]dt.

(10)

ˆi* = 0.5( zˆi + ˆi + ˆ + Tˆ − pˆ i − ˆi )

According to (9), the supportable emissions control rate grows at half
of the rate of growth of the different parameters: the ratio of trade to GDP

( zi ) , the welfare loss per % tariff rate , the penalty tariff rate (T), and the
participation rate ( ) . The supportable emissions control rate declines at half
of the rate of decline of the cost of the backstop technology ( pi ) and of the
carbon-output ratio ( i ). Also, hardly surprising, the strength of the
penalties (here, the tariff rate) increases the strength of the system. Note that
in the simplest model, output growth does not enter the final equations.
The impact of parameters on supportable emissions is non-linear.
Calculations show that the elasticities of supportable emissions at a 50%
emissions control rate with respect to  , T , and p are, respectively, -1.5, -1.0,
and -0.5.
One important insight here, which will be seen important in the
empirical estimates, is the role of technology in strengthening the club. The
two technological parameters are the cost of the backstop technology
(productivity growth in renewables) and the rate of exogenous
decarbonization (which can operate through many factors such as energy
efficiency or conservation). These are important factors in strengthening the
power of the club mechanism.
The analysis can provide qualitative results, but only empirical club
modeling can answer the question of the feasibility of climate clubs for
inducing deep emissions reductions. The next section provides insights from
empirical modeling.
III. Empirical modeling of participation with trade sanctions
Overview
This section moves to a dynamic optimization approach using the
standard DICE model with trade sanctions included (see Nordhaus 2017 for
a description of the DICE model). This is called the Trade-DICE, or TDICE
model, representing the idea that we are integrating the standard DICE
10

integrated assessment model with a trade component. I emphasize that the
exercise is extremely simple, in the spirit of the analytical approach above,
and primarily intended to illustrate the power of a climate club to provide
the glue for an international climate agreement.
Here is the basic setup. The analysis begins with the standard DICE
model with two modifications. One is that the parameters are slightly
changed so that the abatement will represent the optimal behavior of a
“representative country.” This primarily involves changing the damage
parameter to reflect the global public-goods character of climate damages.
The second modification is to add the trade module. As in the example
above, the country decides whether to join the club with costly abatement, or
to stay out of the club and experience costly trade penalties.
The model calculates the supportable target carbon price, emissions
reductions, and emissions for the representative country. The supportable
policy is one where the cost of abatement just equals the cost of the trade
sanction. We can interpret the supportable policies as the maximum possible
club policy. Policies that have lower target carbon prices obviously have
lower abatement. Higher target carbon prices induce countries to drop out of
the club and therefore have lower abatement (as countries move to their
national targets, which are substantially lower and essentially zero).
Model details for TDICE
This section describes the structure of the TDICE model. I assume that
people are familiar with the DICE model, which is a global model linking
population, total factor productivity, investment, output, emissions,
concentrations, climate, impacts, and policy. The TDICE model has two
major changes from the standard DICE; each will be explained after they are
described.
1. The first change is to change the model from a global model to a
model of a representative country.
2. The second change is to introduce trade sanctions so that each
country can weigh the cost of reducing CO2 emissions if in the club
against the trade sanctions if not in the club.
Representative country. To transform the global DICE model into a
stylized regional model requires primarily changing the damage structure. I
assume that there are ten identical countries each of which is 10% of the
global economy. The outcome would be identical to the global model if there
11

are no externalities. To incorporate the climate externalities, it is necessary to
reduce the damages by 90% to reflect the fact that each country gets only 10%
of the damages. If the model is optimized with the smaller damages, the
outcome is almost exactly the same as the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium
in a multi-region model. Each country has the same structure as the global
economy but has only 10% of the damages. By reducing the damage rate to
one-tenth of the global total and keeping all other parameters the same, we
can mimic the behavior of a representative country behaving noncooperatively (i.e., maximizing its own welfare).
Trade sanctions. The other major change is to introduce trade sanctions
for countries that do not meet the target-carbon-price objective. The formula
for the cost is provided in equation (1) above. To calculate the supportable
policies, we add a constraint that abatement cost equals sanctions cost, as
shown in equation (5). The optimization is then to maximize welfare (quite
close to minimizing cost) subject to the abatement cost equal the tradesanctions cost. In GAMS language, the two key new equations are the
following:
*Trade Equations
TRCeq(t)..
Abatetradeeq(t)..

TRC(t)
TRC(t)

=e= Openness(t)*Welfloss*Tariff*fracclub;
=e= Abaterat(t);

Here TRC(t) = trade-sanctions costs as a fraction of output; Openness(t) =
trade/output ratio; Welfloss = welfare lose per unit tariff; Tariff = uniform
tariff rate; fracclub= fraction of global emission in club; and Abaterat(t) =
abatement cost as ratio to output.
Algorithmics. The program is run for 19 periods (through 2100). The full
model with 16 regions, 3 tariff rates, 3 rates of decarbonization, and 3 rates of
backstop decline takes about 3 minutes. No issues of multiple equilibria or
infeasibility were encountered.
Parameter estimates
The basic DICE model uses the DICE-2016R3 version. This was the
2016 model updated to 2018 prices and used in Nordhaus (2019). Major
parameters were examined in early 2019 to determine whether there were
significant changes. None were found, so the model was unchanged except
for some adjustments to clean the code.
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Preliminary tests indicated that six parameters would have major
impacts on the estimates: These were openness (trade-output ratio), the tariff
rate, the rate of decarbonization, the fraction of the world in the club, the
welfare loss per unit tariff, and the rate of technological change in the
backstop technology.
Additionally, several parameters were found to be unimportant. These
are the rate of growth of GDP, the ratio of national to global social cost of
carbon, and the damage function. Other parameters of the DICE model were
not tested.
Two of the six parameters have a historical record: the carbon ratio
(CO2/GDP, or  i in the analysis above and sigma in the modeling) and the
openness ratio (Imports/GDP, or zi in the analysis above and openness in the
modeling). Since 1980, these have each been declining at about 2% per year.
The openness ratio took a sharp drop after the 2008 financial crisis and has
just recovered, while the carbon ratio has declined steadily over the last few
years. For purposes of modeling, I assume that openness will resume a
growing trend, but at a slower rate than the last half century, at 1% per year.
The rate of decarbonization will be taken at the DICE model assumption of 1½%/year based on the most recent data. However, we emphasize that
innovation policy can affect this ratio and examine two alternative values
that increase decarbonization to -2½ %/year and -3½%/year.
Another critical policy parameter, but one without a strong empirical
support, is the price of the backstop technology ( p ). . This can be measured
indirectly from abatement cost functions of the type shown in equation (2),
but there are no persuasive data from which to observe the evolution of the
backstop price. One possible approach is to examine changes in the price of
renewable (or more precisely non-carbon) energy sources. Estimates in
Fouquet (2018) indicate that the prices of solar and wind technology have
declined at between 8 and 10% per year from 1980 to 2015. Nuclear energy
costs have risen over the period, although the actual changes differ by
country. Outside of electricity, the data are sparser, although there have been
gains in transportation and heating. It should be emphasized that these gains
have been largely in the context of zero carbon prices.
For the baseline estimates, I assume that the rate of decline of the cost
of the backstop technology is 0.2% per year. I will examine two alternatives,
decline rates 2% per year and 4% per year, to emphasize that the evolution of
13

low-carbon technologies is an important component of an effective climatechange policy.
Three other parameters are quantitatively important: the tariff rate
(tariff), fraction of the world in the club (frclub), and the welfare loss per unit
tariff (welfloss). The tariff rate is an important design features of the climate
club. We test alternative tariff rates, but the outcome (as seen in the analysis
above) is that the supportable carbon price is a function of the square root of
the tariff rate.
The fraction of the world in the club (frclub) is an endogenous outcome
variable that is a function of all the other variables. Nordhaus (2015)
calculated these variables for alternative policies for a single year. The
current research, however, cannot perform an analysis of stable coalitions, so
the values of frclub vary from 10% to 90%. The 10% value measures whether
the club is attractive when it is small, while the 90% value measures its
stability when virtually all countries are members.
The welfare loss per unit tariff (welfloss) is a complicated structural
parameter that is a function of output composition, trade policies,
transportation costs, product heterogeneity, and other variables. We have
taken estimates from Ossa (2015), as noted above. The results are sensitive to
welfloss, but the parameter is not part of either trade or climate policy.
Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize a critical shortcoming
of the modeling here (and in most other integrated assessment models). This
is the exogenous feature of technological change. History and empirical
studies show conclusively the importance of prices and market size on the
rate and direction of technological change (see particularly Popp 2002, 2004).
However, with a few exceptions, implementing an empirically based strategy
for introducing endogenous technological change has proved elusive. Since
part of the rationale for the climate club is to raise carbon prices, and that
would be a strong incentive for carbon-saving technological change, we can
at this stage simply emphasize that the impact of the club structure is
undervalued in the modeling below because there is no automatic market or
governmental innovative response to the changing carbon prices. We envision
further work on this issue, but that will have to wait for another day.
IV. Modeling Results for Dynamic Aggregative Climate Club
Begin with a word on targets. In the discussion below, we compare the
results with two normative standards. One is the cost-benefit optimum from
earlier runs of the DICE model. This run stabilizes temperature at about 3 °C
14

by the end of the century. To attain the optimal path requires stabilizing
emissions between 25 and 40 billion tons of CO2 emissions per year by mid21st century. A second standard, adopted by countries as a target, is limiting
temperature change to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, this being the “2degree limit.” The 2-degree target requires attaining zero emissions by mid21st century, with negative emissions after that. Each of these two approaches
has arguments on each side. Those will not be reviewed here. Rather, the
point is to determine whether the club will achieve either or both, and under
what conditions. These are oversimplified but reasonably accurate ways of
considering whether a climate club can achieve the desired objectives.
This section contains the results of the TDICE modeling of the
dynamics of climate clubs. The parametric assumptions are contained in
Table 1. The base parameters use the assumptions from the standard DICE
model with or without the club structure. The second column shows the
range of assumptions. The last three columns contain assumptions about
three different policy scenarios combining the strength of the club and
technological change.

Parameter of policy

Base
parameters

Range of
values

Low
policy

Medium
policy

High
policy

Carbon club design features
Uniform tariff rate
No policy
Club

0.1%
5%

0.1 to 10%

5%

10%

10%

50%

10% to 90%

50%

50%

50%

Technological features
Decline backstop cost per year
Rate of decarbonization per year

0.2%
1.5%

0.2% to 4%
1.5% to 3.5%

0.2%
1.5%

2.0%
2.5%

4.0%
3.5%

Structural parameters
Ratio national to global SCC

10%

5% to 10%

10%

10%

10%

1%

0% to 2%

1%

1%

1%

0.40%

No variation

0.40%

0.40%

0.40%

Fraction of world in club

Annual growth rate openness
Welfare loss of tariffs, fraction of
national income at 10% tariff

Table 1. Assumption on major parameters for TDICE model

15

Results for base parameters
Begin with the runs for the base values of the parameters. These can be
interpreted as ones in which all TDICE values are at their current levels, with
no induced technological change or programs to speed the development and
introduction of low-carbon technologies. Figure 1 shows the sustainable
emissions with base parameters and penalty tariff rates from 0% to 10%. This
analysis assumes that a uniform tariff of 10% is the maximum that is
consistent with maintaining the current world trade system.
The path associated with 0% tariff is a baseline path with rising
emissions. The highest penalty tariff stabilizes emissions at around 30
GtCO2/year but does not meet a target path that would reach zero emissions
by 2050. This suggests that a base-parameter climate club can achieve the
optimal path in the next half-century, but it cannot achieve the more
ambitious objective of the 2-degree target.
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Figure 1. Sustainable CO2 emissions with base parameters and alternative
penalty tariffs
Rapid technological change
The analysis in the first section suggested that sustainable emissions
reductions could be more aggressive with more rapid technological change.
There are two possible routes for rapid change. One is to lower the cost of
substitute technologies. This is represented in the TDICE model as lowering
16

the cost of the backstop technology. (The backstop technology is one that can
replace all carbon fuels and is superabundant, assumed to be about $660 per
ton of CO2 currently.) As discussed above, we investigate the impact of
policies that would lower the cost of the backstop (substitute) technologies at
2% per year and 4% per year.
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Figure 2. Supportable emissions for alternative rates of technological change
and no-policy scenario
___________________________
Figure 2 compares the supportable policies for different technological
assumptions. The “NoPol” is the standard DICE model with base
technological change and no club. The policy scenarios are ones the three in
the right-hand columns of Table 1: low policy, medium policy, and high
policy. The low policy scenario has a moderate penalty tariff (5%) and the
base technological assumptions. The medium and high policies have the high
tariff (10%) plus the middle technology and the high technology
assumptions, respectively.
Even the LoPol improvement has a substantial impact on emissions.
Looking at 2050 emissions, introducing the club lowers emissions from61
GtCO2/yr to 36 GtCO2/yr. These decline to 9 GtCO2/yr with the middle
variant and -8 GtCO2/yr for the high variant in 2050. In other words, with a
maximal effort to improve non-carbon technologies along with strong
incentives to join the club, zero emissions are feasible by mid-21st-century.
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Another question is the relative power of decarbonization and
decrease in the cost of the backstop technology. Table 2 shows the impact on
2050 emissions of policies, starting from no policy, to four technological
assumptions in a strong club. Both rapid decarbonization and a rapid
improvement in the backstop technology improve on a strong club, although
the backstop decline of 4% per year is slightly more powerful than more
rapid decarbonization by 2% per year.

Policy Scenario

Emissions, 2050
(GtCO2/yr)

No Policy

60.6

Strong Club, Base Technologies

27.6

Strong Club, Rapid Decarbonization

8.6

Strong Club, Rapid Backstop Decline

2.4

Strong Club, Both

-8.0

Table 2. Interaction technological policies and the climate club
Impact of club size
An important issue is the impact of different size clubs on the
incentives to participate. For example, a small club will have little leverage
because the penalty tariffs will have only a small economic impact on nonparticipants. Conversely, a large club that covers most countries will have
maximal power to induce countries to participate.
To test the impact of club size, we examined the supportable emissions
for club size from 0.01% to 99.9% of world trade. The results are shown in
Figure 3 for 2050 emissions (using base parameters in Table 1). Not
surprisingly, the larger the club, the lower the supportable emissions
reductions. Additionally, the impact is non-linear, with a major reduction for
even small club size. The non-linearity is shown in the analytical section
above in equations (5) through (9).

18

70

U

CO2 emissions, 2050 (GtCO2)

60
50
40

30
20
10
0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Club size (fraction of world trade)

Figure 3. Sustainable emissions in 2050 for different club sizes
______________________________
The strong incentive of even small clubs is an encouraging feature,
suggesting that a small group of countries with a modest fraction of world
trade and emissions can start the process. This point is indeed the opposite of
the current climate negotiations in the Conference of the Parties which are
based on the principle of unanimity. In terms of the club theory, the current
arrangement means that a single holdout can stymie a coalition and leave the
world stuck up at point U in Figure 3.
III. Effects of country heterogeneity in the TRICE model
The modeling of the TDICE model just described assumes identical
countries. In reality, countries have different structures and therefore
different benefits and costs, which would result in different supportable
policies. A rough idea of the differences can be obtained by examining the
key parameters for major regions. This model examines the behavior with 15
regions and is called the TRICE model.
What parameters are important to include in a regional model? The
analytical model showed that the supportable policies will depend upon four
parameters that differ across countries. These are openness, the welfare loss
per unit tariff, the emissions-output ratio, the growth of total factor
productivity, and the cost of the backstop technology. The dynamic model
uses the same regional structure as the 2015 C-DICE model, with 15 regions
(Brazil, Canada, China, EU, Eurasia, India, Japan, Latin American, Mideast,
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Russia, South Africa, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, US, and rest of
world). The major parameters for each region are estimated from current
data as described in the appendix.
The regional models differ for the parameters described in the last
paragraph (GDP, cost of backstop technology, openness, tariff vulnerabilities,
abatement cost, emissions, TFP growth, decarbonization rate, etc.). However,
they have identical structures for several parameters such as population
growth, rate of decline of TFP growth and decarbonization, and (obviously)
the global climate model. The varying parameters are contained in Appendix
Table A-1.
The results for the regional model are close but not identical to those
for the aggregate model. For output, the initial levels are virtually exactly the
same for the aggregated and regional versions. The growth rates over the
2015-60 period are 2.79%/year and 2.92%/year, respectively.
Figure 4 shows the results of the calculations for CO2 emissions for
four policy/technological assumptions for the aggregated and the regional
models. Emissions for the regional version grow between 0.2%/year and
0.4%/year more rapidly that in the aggregated version.
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Figure 4. Effect of country heterogeneity on emissions for alternative
assumptions
The figure shows calculations of supportable policies the aggregate (DICE)
and regional (RICE) models. These are the same policy assumptions as in
Figure 2.
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Regional carbon prices
A first important question that is addressed when allowing for country
heterogeneity is the difference in supportable price across region. Table 3
shows supportable carbon prices by region for the moderate climate policy.
The calculations indicate that China and Russia have very low supportable
carbon prices, in the order of $80/tCO2 in 2020. By contrast, Sub-Saharan
Africa and Eurasia have high supportable prices, over $200/tCO2 in 2020.
The differences are primarily due to the emissions-output ratio and estimates
of the cost of the backstop technology. Note that they do not depend at all on
estimates of damages.

Region
World
Russia
Safrica
China
Brazil
EU
US
Canada
India
Japan
Mideast
SEAsia
LatAm
Eurasia
ROW
SSA
Wt average

2015

2020

2050

139
68
73
77
91
96
104
112
118
126
138
161
165
190
267
285
101

148
72
76
86
91
103
110
116
126
133
141
173
173
200
281
305
109

221
97
90
168
85
162
149
144
187
180
159
256
235
271
380
452
170

Table 3. Supportable target carbon prices by region, moderate climate
policies
Carbon price Laffer curve
Perhaps the most revealing result is the “carbon price Laffer curve,”
shown in Figure 5. This shows the relationship between the target carbon
price and total emissions reductions (using 2050 as an example). Here is the
point: At a zero carbon price, there are no emissions reductions. As the target
carbon price rises, all participating regions reduce emissions as a function of
the carbon price. However, when the target carbon price passes a country’s
supportable carbon price, the country drops out of the club, and the
country’s emissions go to the non-cooperative level. When the target price
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gets extremely high, there are no participants and therefore no emissions
reductions.
Figure 5 shows how the impact of participation on emissions
reductions using the regional model for three different penalty tariffs (0%,
5%, and 10%). Not surprising is that at 0% tariff the reductions and
supportable carbon prices are extremely low and basically reflect the level of
the non-cooperative policy. Additionally, the supportable prices rise with the
penalty tariff.
The interesting result is the shape of the carbon-price Laffer curve. The
peak emissions reduction comes at $100/tCO2 for the 5% tariff and $160/ton
for the 10% tariff (again, for the year 2050). The peak of the Laffer curve
comes at a point that is close to the weighted average target price for 2050 of
$170/tCO2, as seen in Table 3.
As a final point, note that an international agreement on a climate club
will need to respect the differing interests of regions. For example, it might
be that the US represents the key player and designs a club that is at its
supportable carbon price. The price would be close to the average price
shown in Table 3. A similar observation would apply to China. The 2050
prices would be $149 or $168 per ton CO2 for the US and China. An
alternative would be to choose the price that would maximize emissions
reductions according to the carbon-price Laffer curve, which would be about
$160/tCO2 in 2050.
There might be arguments here about the best choice of a target carbon
price. But the central point is that any of these would be far above the current
global policy, which has an effective carbon price of around $5/tCO2. Even a
fractious and rowdy club would be superior to the current policy under the
Paris Accord of national policies, nationally determined, and without any
enforcement mechanism – clubs of one.
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Figure 5. Emissions reductions at different target carbon prices for three
different penalty tariffs, 2050
The sharp asymmetry of the curve arises for reasons unrelated to the
structure of the club and is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows the curve for
both the aggregated and regional models. Note that the curve has a sharp
discontinuity for the aggregated model, where the break occurs at the
(single) supportable price for the (one region) global model. Since the
regional model has multiple supportable prices, the breaks will be smoothed
out when aggregating the different regions.
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Figure 6. Emission reductions for aggregated and regional models.
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Appendix on multi-region assumptions
The multi-region TRICE model is a marriage of the earlier C-DICE
model and the TDICE model described above. The TRICE model has 15
regions run in parallel but with different parameters as described below. The
global averages are then the sum or the weighted averages of the 15 regions.
The estimates have only an extremely small dependence on global variables
(such as those determined by global climate change), so the errors of running
independently are trivially small. The GAMS code is contained in the file
Sources-Nordhaus-DynamicClub-091919.docx.
The empirical structure of the TRICE model is similar to earlier
versions of the RICE model (Nordhaus-Yang 1996, Nordhaus 2010). It uses
the same structure as the TDICE model with region-specific parameters as
follows:
• The initial cost of the backstop technology varies by region
according to the assumptions in the 2015 C-DICE model.
• The initial openness parameter is based on data from the 2015 CDICE model and uses openness from 2011.
• The welfare parameter is based on data from the 2015 C-DICE
model and uses results from Ossa (2015) and trade data from 2011.
• The value of the CO2-GDP ratio (sigma) is determined from output
data from the IMF, World Economic Outlook database, with CO2
emissions from the EU (EDGAR), with the latest available data
from 2017.
• Productivity growth by region uses output and population from
IMF, World Economic Outlook database and take the initial growth
rate at the average for the 2000-2018 period.
• The rate of decarbonization uses data from the IMF and EDGAR for
the period 1980-2017.
All other parameters are identical for the TDICE and TRICE models.
The runs using the parameters above produced slight differences
between the TRICE and TDICE versions. The parameters for TFP growth and
decarbonization were adjusted slightly for China, India, the Mideast, and
Southeast Asia to harmonize the aggregate and regional models. Table A-1
shows the adjustments to harmonize the two models. The “original” are the
estimates constructed from the data as described above and the “adjusted”
are the estimates after harmonization.
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Initial growth TFP

Initial rate of decarbonization

Region

Original

Adusted

Original

Adusted

China

3.4%

2.5%

-0.5%

-0.6%

India

2.4%

2.0%

-0.1%

-0.3%

Mideast

0.2%

0.0%

SEAsia

-0.2%

-0.3%

Table A-1. Adjustments of parameters for regional model to harmonize with
DICE-2016R3 in % per year for 2015-2020.
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